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ABSTRACT:  As part of the National Bureau's  International Economic 
Indicators project, the entire 1966 short  list of economic indicators for 
the United States was successfully duplicated  for the United Kingdom
for 1950-1972, using monthly  or quarterly time series. The U.K. list 
was then used to establish a preliminary chronology of postwar growth 
cyc!es. Results of analyzing the timing and duration  of the U.K. series 
surport the hypotheses of the IEI ptojec: reference chronologies  can 
be constructed  for other  industrialized market economies,  using 
techniques developed in the United States; techniques developed for 
classical cycles can be adjusted to identify growth  cycles; and the 
timing classification of series can be carried over from the United 
States to other countries and from classical cycles  to growth cycles. 
Results of timing comparisons  among growth cycle turning points for 
the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany  indicate that 
since World War II, U.S. turns have more often followed rather than 
eceded those of the other two countries, a reversal of a long-standing 
relaonship observed before the  var. The implications of such changes 
for trac.ional explanations of how cycles spread from country to 
country are expkiu briefly to illustrate the kinds of work that can be 
Iacilitated with the data and analyses emerging from the lEl project. 
NOTE;  The work on U.K. indicators reported here has received financial  support from the Office of 
Competitive Assessment of (he U.S.  Department of commerce, from The Scherman Foundation, Inc., arid 
from the general funds of  the National Bureau  It has benefited substantially from the studies recently 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report is being issued now in order to present the tentative 
findings on the United Kingdom of the National  Bureau's larger study on itlternatjonal
economic indicators which Geoffrey H. Moore and I began in 1973,  While certain details may well be slightly affected  by subsequent revisions the essential pattern is very clear and is unlikely  to be changed significantly  It is presented in order to make available  the growth cycle  chronology i developed for the United Kingdom,  as well as the timing  comparisons based on it. At its completion, the full report of the tEl  project will include
more than a dozen industrialized,  market-oriented economies. 
It is well to bear in mind that this report was largely prepared in  1 974, before the full analysis of all  U.S. indicatots on a growth cycle basis was available. Clearly, the ultimate  objective of the IEI  project will be  to analyze the behavior of  all  indicators_whether leading,  lagging,  or roughly coincidentat  growth cycle turning points.  The analysis of U.S. indicators on the basis of  a growth cycle chronology  is now available Indeed, the classical  turns relied on here were themselves officially revised yet again in May 1975  on the basis of the review of  them under way in 1974 by a special committee for the Department of Commerce. Comparing classical cycle turning  points for the United  States with growth  cycle turning points for the United Kingdom and at times for  West Germany is clearly a temporary  expedient. The addition,  indeed, of a growth  cycle chronology to the classical  chronology already available for the United States is, of course,  a generally complicating factor and is justified, in my view, only because it is a demonstrably useful and valuable addition to our analytical techniques for  studying instability  in the United States,  It  is, moreover, indisoensable for  the study of  postwar instability  in other industrial economies where rates of growth have often been so rapid and consistejit as altogether  to prevent the  occurrence of classical cycles. The report to follow nlust be viewed from the perspective of when it was prepared, what it tries to do, and why it is being published, It was prepared in order to test whether the initial effort to duplicate the IJ.S. short list with data from other countries was likely to prove a Promising approach to the development of reference
 chronologies and indicators essentially like our
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own for other market-oriented. ir.dustria!jzed economies  It  is our aim in 
the  El project ultimately to test every chronology  with our  computer program and to evaluate each series carefully before 
including it Or)  any final list of currently most reliable indicators of cyclical turning  points for each country we study. What in my view is shown  in this study  s partly.
therefore, the relevance to the growth cycles of recent years of much of our
traditional arsenal of analytical tools for studying classical cycles and the
positive potential of applying our approach to other  countries. 
One of the crucial steps in utilizing the National  Bureau's indicator
approach to the analysis of cyclical disturbances  lies in the choice of 
reference dates. These dates ultimately form the  basis for subsequent
analysis of all time series, including the classification  into leading, roughly
coincident, or lagging indicators. The choice begins  with the selection of 
appropriate turning points in a number of individual time series, primarily
those coincident series that constitute  measures of aggregate economic
activitythat is, income, output; employment,  and the like. The conver­
sion of such information into reference dates involves judicious determina­
lion of what constitutes the "preponderance" of evidence of the existence 
of a genuine change in direction (for classical cycles) or cyclical deviations 
from trend (for growth cycles). Ultimately, the  appropriateness of the 
reference dates can be judged by the behavior of a variety of measures of 
economic activity occurring at about the  same time as the reference dates. 
Thus, while the reference dates  are required to differentiate leading, 
roughly coincident, and lagging indicators, the appropriateness of the dates 
can also be judged, most especially when there is a considerable historical 
record on which to base timing classifications, by the  consistency with 
which leaders lead, coinciders coincide, and laggers  lag. 
Since the original formulation of the technique by Burns and Mitchell, 
such an historical record has, of course, been built up, most particularly for 
the United States. vVhile the list of "most reliable indicators" has  been 
revised a number of times (the first such publication  was in 1938, and 
revisions were made in 1950, 1 960, and 1966) and most recently in 1975, 
there has been remarkably little change in the basic classification  of time 
series. The changes made have been far  more likely to reflect changes in 
the adequacy of our statistics or in the basic importance of the economic 
activity reflected (e.g., structural changes) than in the timing behavior of 
the series. 
If the dating of changes in the fundamental activity of economies is even 
now less exact than perhaps we should like  it  to he,  it  has come a 
significant way down the scientific path since Willard Thorp (1926) com­
mented with disarming simplicity that his annals "cover the grand divisions 
of economic activity." Today we have been able to convert much of what 
may have begun as a form of codified economic intuition on the part of 106 
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Wesley Clair Mitchell and his early associates,  particularly Thorp,  Simon
 Kuznets, and Arthur Burns, into a computer prograni which not only dates
 turning points  ri individual time series, but helps to seiect
 reference dates
as well. To be sure, it is desirable to review the selections  made by these
computer programs, and trained specialists occasionally  may reject the  I 
choice made by the computer as having overlooked some special  feature of the series or the period which should have been taken into account But

the critical point is that what began as a procedure grounded in informed,
 partially intuitive analysis of cyclical activity has over the years resulted  in

a body of evidence and experience that enables  us now to state a fairly

specific set of rules for choosing turning points,  in series and reference
 dates as well.
 
Although the National Bureau's original program  encompassed the de­
velopment of a technique of cyclical analysis appropriate to "the aggregate
 economic activity of tall] nations that  organize their work  mainly in
 business enterprises" (Burns and Mitchell 1 946,  p. 3), and Thorp's Business

Annals were developed for  some eighteen countries, most of the Bureau's
 research effort in this field has been devoted to the analysis  of Cyclical

instability in the United States. From time to time, however, studies have
 been undertaken which  recall the perspective from  which the Bureau's
 work in business cycle analysis originated; for  example, the study by llse Mintz (1969) of postwar business  cycles in Western Germany.
Mintz's study was significant partly because it refocused attention on the
 original intention of the National Bureau to develop a technique of cyclical
 analysis which could be  usefully applied in all
 industrialized  market­ oriented economies, It was significant as well, however, because it was the
 first major effort  to date turning points in  business cycles defined  and
 measured in trend-adjusted series rather than as changes in direction, as in
 
ret 
are the classical chronologies typical of the period before World War II. The emphasis is 
da: thus appropriately  placed on the kind of  instability most characteristic of present-day, 
market-oriented economies. In this approach, classical recessions 
­
(periods of negative  growth) are subsumed  under low-growth phases.  The classical  c;as recession of the  1 970s suggests the
continued importance of the classical chronology,  along with the growth  I 
cycles more commonly 
that encountered since World  War II. Mintz measured  growth cycles in  terms of both "deviation cycles"  mi
essentially cycles in the deviations of a series  from its trend-.--.and  "step 
epF cycles." The latter  is an adaptation of a method originally used by Milton 
aCre 
Friedman and Anna  Schwartz in their study of money, and  concenirates directly on rates of change. Cycle turns are dated in terms of the endings of periods of growth  deemed Particularly  high or low. Mintz found virtually flO substantial differences 
more 
CàLc. between the two  methods in the dating of German cycles. In  this study deviation  cycles only arc used.  (anne Postwar Growth Cycles in the United  Kfrgdom 
It  is always tempting to look br single or at least  simple indicators of cyclical changes. Some analysts still choose to rely on a  single aggregate__ frequently the index of industrial production or Some measure of GNP, or employment, or unemployment_and  argue that cyclical
that measure provide an adequate guide to instability  turning points in 
suitable for reference dates.1 The disadvantages of using  single  measures are, however Although our data, methods, and  serious,
experience with business  cycle niea­ surement have, as noted above,  advanced greatly  in the past  quarter century, Burns and Mitchell's conclusion about the search for short cuts in dating business cycles still  appears appropriate  (1946,  p. 76): 
The conclusion to be drawn  from this condensed  review of statistical  data bearing on aggregate economic  activity is obvious. If  there is no monthly or quarterly series in any of our countries? that can serve by itself as a criterion for setting a reference scale of business  cycles, whether because  the series is  not long enough, or not accurate enough, or not broad enough in its coverage, or not stable enough in its relation  to business cycles, or for all these reasons, then it is necessary to use a more laborious  method; that is, a reference scale of business cycles must be extracted from the fallible indications provided by time series for varied economic activities. 
In the United States the National Bureau's techniques have in  a real sense stood the test of time, While cyclical analysis involves  constant revision and reappraisal  we do have confidence in  our approach because of
accumulated experience. The  Burns and Mitchell  warning is, however,
 most important to reconsider  as we embark on the application of these
 methods to other  economies.
 
The relationship between reference dates and indicators is complex. The
 reference dates summarize the behavior of the  coincident indicators and
 are used to measure the timing of leading and lagging indicators. The basic

classification into the three  groups is based on customary and  reliable behavior over a long period, but the timing of an individual indicator at an individual turning point may on occasion be contrary to the general timing

classification of the  series.
 
The techniques  involved here have stood the  test of time in the sense
that a large and diverse professional audience finds them useful in analyz­
ing business
 instability. (In the United States  there is virtual unanimity in
acceptance of the NBER-based business cycle dates.) However, despite the
emphasis on  aggregate economic activity in Burns and Mitchell's  defini­ tion, major measures of aggregate economic activity  cannot be relied on 
invariably to turn  even roughly in unison. While  we understand much 
more about business  cycles than we did when Burns and Mitchell 
cautioned against relying  on any single series for dating cycles, we still
cannot always adequately  or completely explain that lack of unison.3 But
we do also know that,  despite that lack, the notions of both pattern and 108  Philip A. Klein 
process which lie behind the NBER approach to measuring and analYzing 
instability are valid: the timing relationships that have enierged from  the 
NBER approach have remained in evidence for many years. The  excep­
tions, the occasional changes in the behavior of particular Series,  the 
emergence of better data and better techniques for measuring and adjusting 
all data, the real changes in the character of business cycles in the United 
States and elsewhere, all these and related changes have not affected  the 
basic interrelationships that emerged from the introduction of the  NBER 
technique and led conceptually to the introduction of leading,  roughly
coincident, and lagging indicators of the reference dates selected  for 
successive business cycles. 
The experience with dating business fluctuations just summarized has 
largely been confined to classical cycles. The Mintz study, already men­
tioned, on West Germany, and her rnor  recent development of a growth 
cycle chronology for the United States (Mintz 1974) represent first efforts to 
apply the techniques previously developed for dating classical  cycles to the
kind of growth cycle typical of enterprise-oriented economies since World 
War U. The analysis presented here is restricted to  my preliminary work 
with data for the United Kingdom, the first country for which the National 
Bureau's International Economic Indicators project has  produced a fairly
complete set of data. Perusal of the  progress reports emerging from the 
International Economic Indicators project will show that variants of Busi­
ness Conditions Digest, the Department of Commerce's  monthly updating
of U.S. indicators based  on the NBER methodology, have been roughly 
duplicated  for  both Japan and Canada, using  somewhat the same 
methodology as in BCD. Preliminary work  suggests that the method will
indeed be applicable to many if not all of the countries for which Burns 
and Mitchell originally viewed it as being appropriate. 
A NOTE ON METHODOtOGY 
To measure the U.K. growth  cycles,  I employed deviations from a sixty­
month moving average, selected  to approximate the trend (Mintz used  a 
seventy-fivemonh moving average).  As I  noted above, Mintz very  care­
fully compared the  results obtained with  step cycles and with deviation
cycles, and while there  were discrepancies from time to time in the
determination of individual  turning points, in the final analysis the cycles that emerge in the two methods are remarkably alike (Mintz 1970,  p. 20). In view of her results it was decided early in the present work to dispense with the laborious, hence expensive, step cycle technique.
Recently, in connection with deviation cycles, work  has proceeded at Postwar Growth Cycles in the United Kingdom 
i09 
the National Bureau designed to avoid  one of the defects ir  the moving average representation of the trend, namely,  undue flexibility  in the trend rate of growth. The technique that is being 
developed, however  will not greatly affect the turning points of deviation cycles which are our primary concern. For example, in an experiment with this new technique the U.K. industrial production index produced ten turning points in deviation cycles between 1951 and 1972 with both a Sixty-month moving average and the new phase-averaging method. In both trials, all the turning points but one occurred in the same month. In that one case, there was a difference of one month. This test supports my experimental use in this paper of the moving average trend for the U.K. data: I was in fact able 
to approximate the basic pattern of turns in growth cycles by the simple method of deviation from a sixty-month moving average. 
The deviations were, of course, calculated with seasonally adjusted data. In order to obtain deviations for all the  data, a straight line  was fitted, utilizing the first sixty and last sixty months in each series,  and then drawn
so as to pass through the thirtieth month from the 
beginning and from the end. Then the fitted line was used only for the first thirty  and last thirty
months in each series, with the  moving average used for the rest. In this
way an approximation was obtained to a sixty-month moving average for
the entire length of each series, and the turns were selected in the ratio of
the seasonally adjusted data  to this trend. 
DATING GROWTH CYCLES IN  THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In order to make the task of data collection and analysis  manageable the
initial effort was limited to obtaining the closest possible equivalents to the 
NBER short list of twenty-six cyclical indicators, plus some few other series 
deemed important for one reason or another. Since Mintz's sole aim was to 
date cycles, she restricted  herself with few exceptions to the acquisition
and analysis of roughly  coincident series, whereas I  include leaders and 
laggers as well. Thus the  business cycle turning points chosen for  the 
United Kingdom can be tested somewhat more fully than Mintz could  test 
her German turning points. Furthermore, Mintz utilized the NBER  comput­
er program for all turning point selections.  While the turning points for the 
United Kingdom and  all other countries will ultimately be checked by 
computer, the turns in this initial study have  been selected (as described
below) according to the rules embodied in the Bry-Boschan program, but
applied by the conventional judgmental method customarily utilized at the
NBER. The following are my tentatively selected turning points in postwar
U.K. growth  cycles: 110 
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Peaks  Troughs 
February 1 951  October 1952
 
December 1 955  November 1958
 
November 1960  February 1963
 
August  1 965  August 1967
 
December 1 968  February 1972 
These choices were made  on the basis of twelve time  series which approximate the roughly coincident indicators on the U.S. short list. Of the eight indicators on the list, only onemanufacturing and trade saIes._as not available for the United Kingdom.  I  obtained more or less preciseI
comparable U.K. time series dealing with the index of industrial  production and with total wholly  unemployed. For quarterly GNP  in current and  in constant dollars I used  gross domestic product at  current prices and  at 1970 prices. I also used a British series on GNP at factor 
Costs, although it is currently available only  for a short period of time. For the  personal income series on the U.S. list, I employed a series  on personal disposable income in 1963 prices for the United Kingdom,  and a second  series on total personal income before  taxes. Both series were available only quar­ terly. For employees on nonagricultural payrolls I  used two rough equiva­ lents: a monthly index on employees in employment  in production indus­ tries (mining. rnanufactttring  construction, and utilities)  and a quarterly series on total employees  in employment. For the U.S. series  on sales of retail stores  I employed both  a volume and a value index  of retail sales, corresponding to ones on the U.S. short list, and I added a series on adult job vacancies, It is included in the U.S. long list of coincident series, and is being increasingly  viewed as of  considerable significance  both in the United States and  elsewhere 6 
The detailed examination of growth cycle turning points in each of these roughly coincident  indicators suggests the  extent to which the British
economy experienced these  mild but nonetheless  clearly visible cyclical
 changes in
  its postwar  rate of growth. They  appear in each roughly
 coincident indicator.
 However, because the ratios of cyclical to irregular
 components vary among
 indicators, 5ome of them are harder to date (e.g.,
 current or constant gross domestic product) than others (e.g., the index of industrial production)  The most  cursory examination of the  charts in Appendix A  suggests that growth  cycles have been  as prominent in the postwar British economy as in that of the United States. Their number and timing, however  differ from those  of their U.S.  counterparts7 Detailed examination of the behavior of roughly coincident indicators in postwar Britain reveals  clearly the dangers  in attempting to date business cycles on the basis of a single indicator, no matter how broad the coverage S
111  postwar Growth Cycles in the United Kirigdoni 
or dear the turns may be. In particular, U.K. history Suggests that in several
cases (e.g., the peaks in 1960 and 1965), choosing the. turning point in the
index of industrial production to represent the growth cycle turning point
would be misleading because ni the emphasis  it  would place
movements peculiar to that index. 
upon 
The choice of appropriate turning points proved difficult  in a few 
instances. Occasonally, special Circumstances had to be taken  into ac­
count. As a result, some choices appear to conflict with the evidence. An 
obvious example would be the selection of a trough in the monthly  series 
on employees in employment in January 1959 rather than May 1959, 
although the latter represents the largest decline recorded in  the series. 
The explanation here is to be found in a redefinition of the series in the 
latter month that produced the recorded decline, but obviously  does not 
represent any significant change in the underlying employment situation. 
This is, of course, occasionally the case in choosing turning points--the
definition of the series presents fewer problems than changes  in  the 
definition, since absolute levels of any of these measures are of less interest 
than their movements over time. Ideally, we should have a new series in 
which the measure, in this case employment, is defined consistently in 
either the old or the new way. As this cannot presently be done the  turn 
must be adjusted to accord with economic rather than graphic fact to the 
extent possible. 
A similar apparent anomaly occurs at the 1971 trough in gross domestic 
product in constant prices, because the choice of August 1 971 is dictated 
by the behavior of the series on the new 1970 base, while the series on the 
1963 base was used for the bulk of the period. Clearly the recently 
accelerated inflation rate has complicated the analysis of instability in the 
United Kingdom as elsewhere. The increased volatility of many measures 
of British economic activity in the period since 1967 and the resultant 
greater difficulty  in dating cyclical turns  is  well exhibited by GDP in 
constant prices, which in fact shows six peaks of sorts in a four-year 
period.8 
THE EVIDENCE FOR INDIVIDUAL GROWTH 
CYCI..E TURNS, 1950-1 972 
February 1951 Peak 
There is considerable agreement in the behavior of the few time series that 
extend back to 1 950 that 1 951 represented  a peak year. The turn selected, 
in February, conforms to the turn in both the index of industrial production I
e
I 
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and in employment, though unemployrilent  and vacancies turned  some­
what later in the yedi. 
October 1952 Trough 
Again, the evidence all points toward a trough during the year, though this 
time the index of industrial production turns four to five months before all 
the measures of employment. The selected turn, in October, gives some 
weight to this discrepancy in the measures of production and employment. 
December 1955 Peak 
The 1955 peak, in contrast, exhibits almost identical timing in all the 
measures available except the two GDP series.0 Two series lead slightly, 
but both production and employment conform to the month selected for 
the turn. 
November 1958 Trough 
The month chosen conforms to the behavior of most of the employment 
series, but represents a compromise in some respects between GDP in 
constant prices, which turned up in May, and GOP in current prices, as 
well as the value index of retail sales, which did not turn up until early in 
the following year. In general, all of the measures turned up between May 
1958 and March 1 959. The month selected represents an effort to balance 
these factors, and is supported as well by the composite index of coinci­
dent indicators considered below. 
November 1960 Peak 
The selection of a reference peak in 1960-1961 is a good example of the 
perils of relying on the index of industrial production alone. The peak, 
March 1960, clearly leads all the other  measures of economic activity 
utilized, although there is a very slow and extremely volatile decline which 
does not accelerate sharply until the middle of 1961. All the employment 
measures decline in early 1961, and except for the monthly employment 
measure (which turns down in April 1961 but nevertheless stays quite high 
until it falls somewhat precipitously in  1 962), the turns are far more sharply 
drawn than is the case with production.  With two minor exceptions the 
other series represented  among the coincident indicators (and by this 
period all twelve are included) also all turn in 1961. The placing of the turn 
in late 1960 is designed to  give some weight to the preponderance of 113 
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evidence, but tempered by the important, albeit 
atypical, behavior  of production. 
February 1963 Trough 
The trough in February 1 963 is one of the most clear-cut. Real  disposable income turns nine months earlier, and production  turns in January, hut
seven of the twelve measures turn precisely in February, 
and the rest within 
one month. 
August 1965 Peak 
The choice is troublesome and, in the final analysis, the date selected  is an effort to strike a suitably weighted balance  with the evidence and  the
factors which have affected it. Once again the turn in the production index, 
January 1965, is quite clear-cut and well ahead of the turns in all  except
two of the other indicators. There is some evidence that the peaks observed
in the first four months of 1966 in two of the employment series were
affected by special factors in the  economy. A decline in the normal hours
of work may have artificially (and temporarily) stimulated the demand for 
labor, thereby postponing the peak. The  introduction of the National Plan 
may have been responsible for a short-run optimism  which maintained 
levels of employment as well as sales and income until late 1965 or early
1966, but it  is difficult to explain why the sustained high levels in those
areas were not reflected in production as well,!1 
In sum, there are a number of complicating factors, but the choice of
August 1965 appears to be  a reasonable compromise. it was the month in
which adult vacancies and GNP in factor cost turned, While this occurred 
more than six months after the turn in the  production index, it was well
ahead of the other indicators,  some of which did not turn until well into 
1966 (real disposable income turned down in February; unemployment did 
not reach its turn until April). Selection  of the turn well illustrates the 
problem of settling  on a single month when turns  in the coincident 
indicators themselves  are scattered over a period of more than twenty 
months. The choice is justified,  however, in part because the leaders and 
laggers, described below, exhibit the appropriate timing at the turn. 
August 1967 Trough 
The choice of August 1967 as a trough date presents little difficulty. Real 
disposable income  turned  in February, and the monthly employment 
measure turned the following April, but  all the other indicators turned 
within a few months  of August. S
S
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December 1 968 Peak 
Dating the peak in 1968 was extremely difficult, once more because of the 
wide dispersion in the turns in individual indicators. The  eniployment
measures do not turn until 1970, whereas both real disposable income and 
retail sales (value index) turn in early 1968. But the production  index, the
volume index of retail sales, and gross domestic product in both current 
and constant prices turn within a few months of December  1968. Again the 
choice represents a balancing of evidence pointing to both earlier and later 
dates as well as the date selected. 
February 1972 Trough 
The final  turn,  in February 1972, must be regarded  as an extremely 
tentative first choice, because I  have not yet examined the data beyond 
1972. Both the production index and two of the  available employment
series conform to the date chosen, although a good many other series turn 
earlier. It is clear that the British  economy was weakening less rapidly if no 
yet recovering in 1971, and so the date finally chosen  may be somewhat 
different. Although the leaders behaved appropriately at the selected date,
there is as yet little information  on the lagging indicators. 
APPRAISING THE BRITISH REFERENCE  TURNS 
I have attempted above to indicate briefly the basis for my choice of dates
for postwar British growth  cycles. The degree to which the  choices made
may be said to represent British growth  cycles may be measured by
consistency, dispersion of the turns in  individual important series around
the dates selected,  etc. The evidence of representativeness, particularly if
compared with similar evidence for the United States or other countries,
will reflect not only the appropriateness of the choices made, but may also
give some indication of possible  structural differences between the British
economy and those other  industrialized, market-oriented  economies.
A convenient way to summarize much of the evidence for appraising the adequacy of the U.K. growth cycle chronology  is to examine the relation­ ship between these  dates and the turning points for composite indexes of the twelve leading, six roughly coincident, and  six lagging indicators most
closely approximating  the indicators  on the U.S. short list. A composite
index of indicators is  of course sensitive to the magnitude as well  as the direction of changes in the component series.'2 Chart 1 shows the behavior of the composite  indexes of U.K. leading, roughly coincident, and lagging indicators; and the  essential timing relationships are summarized in Table 1. Since these indexes  have not yet been  adjusted for long-term growth, CHART 1  Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and
Lagging Indicators, United  Kingdom, 1948-.1972 
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'Pno to this point, index is based on fewer than half the series in the group.
 
whereas the growth cycle dates  are based on trend-adjusted data, lags at 
peaks and leads at troughs are to be expectedand this is what we find in 
the coincident index. Nevertheless, the finding that the composite index of 
U.K. roughly coincident indicators has a median timing of zero at growth 
cycle peaks and troughs suggests that the U.K. turning points reasonabJy 
well represent the preponderance of evidence they are designed to sum­




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































postwar Growth Cycles in the United Kingdom 
1966 peak. The composite index of the leading indicators  leads at all the 
turns except the 1 951 and 1968 peaks and 1-Y dbOUt Six  months on the 
average (the 1951 peak is represented by very few series). The  mean and 
median leads of the composite index of leaders  over that of the roughly
coincident indicators are 5.5 and 8.4 months respectively.  In the lagging
index a sharply rising trend obscures virtually all the cyclical 
movements.
On the whole, however, it  is fair to say that the  composite indexes
at least the leading and coincident indexessupport the general 
represen
tativeness of the growth cycle chronology selected. Each phase  is reflected 
in the leading and coincident indexes, and no additional phases  appear.
Table 2 provides a convenient summary of much of the  relevant evi­
dence for comparing the behavior of the roughly coincident indicators for 
the United States, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. In considering 
the comparisons, it  is well to remember that the time periods  covered are 
not identical. The U.S. data often cover long periods. The West German 
data mostly cover 1950-1967; the U.K. data, 1950-1 972. But not all the 
U.K. and West German series were available  even  for the postwar 
periods.'4 (For the coverage of the U.K. series utilized here  see Table 4 
below.) 
In addition to differences in coverage, there may be  some discrepancies in 
behavior based on differences in the way the series are defined. Still other 
discrepancies may be the result of using measures selecd for the United 
States rather than some other country, but this would be  more likely to 
explain discrepancies in leading or lagging series rather than in the roughly 
coincident ones. In connection with the latter, there  is  less room for 
variation from country to country in what constitutes an adequate  measure 
of "aggregate economic activity." Nevertheless, discrepancies among these 
series at turning points might be greater in other countries than in the 
United States if, as might well be argued, business fluctuations have been 
more pronounced in the United States than in other market economies. 
The charge has been considered thus far primarily for U.S. classical cycles, 
however. 
In Table 2, the eight indicators currently included in the roughly coinci­
dent group for the United States have been supplemented by several other 
roughly coincident indicators available for one or the other of these 
countries and considered particularly useful. Median behavior is sum­
marized by the arithmetic mean of the medians for the individual indi­
cators and by the median of the medians. Measured either way, the results 
are similar. The single most important conclusion to be drawn from the 
evidence presented is clear in both measures: the average lead or lag for 
the roughly coincident U.K. indicators is  no greater than that for West 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Phil p A.  Klein 
Restricting the analysis to the first eight indicators in Table 2 (the ofujcij
"short list") we see that two U.S. indicators, two  West German indicators and three U.K. indicators have median leads  or lags more than 
three months from the selected reference turns either at peaks or at troughs  No U.K. median departs by more than six months Ironi  the growth  Cycle turns selected, while one West German median  lags behind its  reference date by nearly twice that figure. In short, the  measures in Table 2  suggest that the behavior of the U.K. indicators is only slightly  more deviant than that of the indicators for the other two countries and, further, that the  U.K. growth cycle dates are thus reasonably representative of the fluctuations in aggre­ gate economic activity they are designed  to reflect. 
This representativeness  can be judged in another way by 
considering the average deviation from growth cycle turns for all the roughly coincident indicators available for the United  Kingdom (Table 3). The average devia­ tion of all the series at peaks and troughs (third column of Table 3) is 4.8 months, which may be compared with the average deviation of 3.4 months for the nine West German series used in Table 2 (Mintz  1970, pp. 36-40) An interesting characteristic  of Table 3, which  was also observed by Mintz in her West Gernian data,  is that the deviations are almost invariably
smaller at troughs than  at peaks. It is also suggested in  Table 2 that the variation in the  average lead or lag of roughly  coincident indicators is smaller for all three  countries at troughs than at peaks. This indication of greater variability  among the indicators at the  onset of growth cycle
recessions than of revivals  suggests, of course, the presence of some factor making the forecasting  of recessions slightly  niore difficult than that of recovery, Fuller consideration of this question, however,  requires analysis of all the indicators 
THE TIMING OF  INDIVIDUAL INDICATORS  AT
 
POSTWAR GROWTH
 CYCLE TURNS 
Fable 4 contains the record of timing for all  thiy-eig}it British indicators in the period since  I 950the essential information  on which this analysis rests__and the results  are Summarized iii Table  5. The story they tell relatively simple. They  echo once again  Mintz's coninient in  connection
is 

















TABLE 3	  Average Deviation from Post-World War II 
Growth Cycle Turns of Roughly Coincident U.K. 
Indicators 
(number of months) 
Peaks 
and
Series  Peaks  Troughs  Troughs 
Employees in employment (index of 
production industries)  7.5  2.6  4.8
Total employees in employment (Q)  4,2  2.0  3.1 
Total wholly unemployed (inverted)  8.2  0.6  4.4 
Gross domestic product, 1970 prices (Q)  8.2  3.8  6.0 
Gross domestic product, current prices (Q)  10.5	  7.5  9.0 
Gross national product at factor cost (Q)  1.5  1.5  1.5 
Index of industrial production  3,0  1.0  2.0 
Personal disposable income, 1963 prices (Q)  5.0  9.8  7.4 
Total personal income before taxes (Q)  8.2  7.5  7.9 
Retail sales, volume index  2.7  4.2  3.6 
Retail sales, value index  5.3  5.2  5.3 
Adult vacancies  3.6  2.4  3.0 
Mean of 12 indicators  5.7  4.0  4.8 
Median of 12 indicators  5.2  3.2  4.6 
SOURCE:  Based on Table 2. 
0 = quaierly data. 
unrelated turns in U.K. indicators out of 273 comparisons (3.7 percent). It 
is worth noting that most of her indicators are roughly coincident. The U.K. 
set, however, includes a number of leaders and laggers, and the unrelated 
turns are largely to be found among the leaders (only two are in the 
coincident group; none in the lagging). The percentage of skipped turns in 
growth cycles is similar, with only 10 instances where a growth cycle turn 
was not matched with a turn in an indicator. 
It is important to remember that the U.K. indicators duplicate essentially 
the entire short list of U.S. indicators. Mintz, as noted, concentrated on just 
the roughly coincident ones, around which the dating of growth cycles 
must necessarily revolve. However, leading and lagging indicators not only 
confirm or cast doubt on the correctness and reliability of the growth cycle 
turns selected, but also provide important information in their own right for 
both forecasting and policymaking, it is instructive, therefore, to note that 
for the fifteen leading U.K. indicators, fully 80 percent of the turns covered 
represented leads, either short or long, and only 5 percent lagged behind 
the reference turns by more than three months (Table 5). Moreover, not 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 129  Growth_Cycles in the United Kiniom p(Jtwar 
experience shows a  preponderance of  lags.  Not Only has the NBER 
2pproach worked  with considerable reliability arid validity in enabling us 
growth cycle turning points in an important industrial economy to date 
other than the United States, but in addition, U.S. classification of leading 
proved useful when applied to the other economy. indicators has 
Among the roughly  coincident indicators 58 percent turned within three 
months of the growth cycle turning point (with only 22 percent exhibiting 
long leads and 20 percent, long lags). The corresponding figure for the U.S. 
set of roughly coincident series at classical business cycle turning points is 
Only three series, personal disposable income, total personal 53 percent. 
income before taxes,  and the index of retail sales value fail to show a 
predominance of roughly coincident turns, and even in the latter two 
series, leads and lags are  about equally numerous. Personal disposable 
income shows five long leads  and only one long lag. 
The behavior of the lagging indicators is even more suggestive; fully 87 
percent of them lag behind comparable growth cycle turns, and only 10 
percent lead. Only the series on  London clearing bank advances shows 
more leads than lags, and  only unemployed 8-26 weeks shows more 
rough coincidences than long lags. 
The pattern of individual indicator behavior at individual growth cycle 
turns emerges clearly in the averages shown in Table 6. The time sequence 
of the turns in average leading, lagging, and roughly coincident indicators 
agrees with expectations at all except one of the reference turns covered, 
whether "typical" is viewed in terms of the mean or the median timing. 
(The single exception is minor.) 
The pattern emerging in Table 6 is summarized in Table 7. (The table is 
confined to the 25 indicators most closely equivalent to the U.S. short list, 
but calculations based on all 38 available British indicators presented the 
same pattern.) However the figures are calculated and no matter what 
series are included, the conclusion is clear that leading indicators lead 
roughly coincident indicators and lagging indicators lag behind roughly 
coincident indicators with a very high degree of consistency. This is true at 
both peaks and troughs of the growth cycle, although the spread between 
leaders and laggers  is  greater at peaks than at troughs.  In sum, the 
experience of the United Kingdom during the past quarter cerltl:ry confirms 
and extends Ilse Mintz's finding that the NBER method of measuring 
business cycles can be successfully applied not only to the L!nited States 
but to other industrial, market-oriented economies. The relationships in­
volved appear to be as widely applicable, on this evidence at least, as 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 7  Summary of Timing Patterns of 25 Indicators 
Matching U.S. Short List at 10 U.K. Growth 
Cycle Turns, 1953-1972 
(number of months) 
At Peaks 
At Peaks  At Troughs  and Troughs 
Mean Lead (-) or Lag (+)
 
12 leading indicators  -6.2  -6.7
  - 6.3
 
7 roughly coincident indicators  *3.2  -2.0
  +0.5
 
6 lagging indicators  + 10.1
  +6.5  +8.3 
Median Lead (--) or Lag (4-)
 
12 leading indicators  --35  _35  35
 
7 roughly coincident indicators  0
  0 0
 
6 lagging indicators  +6.0
  +60 
SOURCE: Medons were computed from Table 4; means are from Table B-2, auaiiable on request to the
National Bureau. 
THE TIMING BEHAVIOR OF INDICATORS 
A THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
Now finally a summary can be made of the behavior at cyclical turning 
points of the set of economic indicators for the United States, West 
Germany, and the United Kingdom (Table 8). It should be reiterated that 
the timing comparisons for the United States were developed for classical 
business cycles, whereas the comparisons for both West Germany and the 
United Kingdom are for growth cycles. Furthermore, Mintz's compilation 
for West Germany included only a few series that were not coincident, 
whereas for the United Kingdom virtually the entire U.S. short list was 
duplicated and analyzed.  In addition, the results may be affected by 
differences in the way series are defined. 
It  is worth noting that there are more exact coincidences among the 
roughly coincident group for the United States than for either West 
Germany or Britain. It is possibly a reflection of more nearly synchronous 
behavior in the United States of the various measures of aggregate 
economic activity, but more probably, it  is a reflection of the difference in 
cycle concepts. Were the U.K. (or the German) chronology restricted to 
classical cycles, there would be far fewer turns to analyze during the 
period covered; by comparison, the United States in the postwar period 
has had more absolute downturns in aggregate economic activity than 
have most other market-oriented economies.17 BUt measured against classi­
cal cycles, the U.K. coincident indicators would no doubt more consis­
tently exhibit exact coincidence. Growth cycles, reflecting fluctuations in r
S
TABlE 8  Comparison of Timing of United States, West 
German, and U.K. Indicators at Business Cycle 




Median Lead (-I or Lag (+) 
United  West  United 
Series (U.S. title)  States  Germany  Kingdom 
Leading indicators
 
Average hours worked, mfg.  -5.0
  -30 
Nonagricultural placements  -3.0  -1.5 
Index of net business formation  -7.0  --35 
-4.5 
New orders, durable goods  -4.0  -4.0 
Contracts and orders, plant and equp­
ment  -6.0  -3.0 
New building permits, pvt. housing  -6.0  -9.0 
Chg. in 1)00k value, mfg. and trade 
inventories  -8.0  -3.0 
Industrial materials prices  -2.0  -5.0 
Stock prices, 500 common stocks  -4.0  -5.0  -7.5 
Corporate profits after taxes (Q)  -2.0  --1.0  -4.0 
Ratio: price to unit labor cost, rulg.  -3.0  -12.0 
Chg. in consumer instal. debt  -10.0  -10.0 
Mean  -5.0  -3.0  -5.7 
Roughly coincident indicators
 
Employees in nonagricultural estab­
lishments
  0  +1.0  +2.0 
Unemployment rate, total (inverted)  o  +2.0  +1.0
GNP in constant dollars, expend.
 
est. (Q)
  -2.0  0  -0.5 
Industrial production  0 0  -0.5
Personal income  -1 .0  + 3 0  0
MIg. and trade sales  0  0 -
Sales of retail Stores  0 -
GNP in current dollars (Q) 
+2.0 
0 0  +1.5
Nonagricultural job openings  0  - 1.0  -0.5 
Mean  -0.3  +0.6  +0.6 
Lagging indicators 
Unemployment rate, 15 vkc. and over
 
(Inverted)
  +2.0  +2.5 
Business expenditures, plant  and 
equipment (Q)  +1.0  -1.0  +9.0 Median Lead () or Lag (+) 
United  West  United 
Series (U.S. title)  States  Germany  Kingdom 
Book value, mfg. and trade inventories  +20  + 6.0 
Labor cost per unit of output, mfg.  +8.0  +14.0 
Commer. and ir.dus. loans outstanding  + 2.0 
Bank rates, short-term business
 
loans (Q)  + 5.0
  -s- 8.5 
Mean  +3.3  (.0  + 6.2 
SOURCE:  United States: Moore and Shiskin (1967, Table 6, col. 2); the figures used here  cover various 
periods. West Germany: Mintz (1970, Tab!e 5), United Kingdom: from Table 4, above. 
West German and U.K. tUrflifl8 points used to determine leads and lags are for growth cycles, and the 
indicators are in trend-adjusted form; United States turning points are for classical business cycles, and  the 
indicators are not trend adjusled. Comparisons are made utilizing the West German and the U.K. series 
most closely approximating each U.S. indicator. 
Q = quarterly data. 
economic activity around trends rather than absolute declines, are less 
severe in their impact and can therefore be expected to show somewhat 
greater variability in their onset in various measures of aggregate economic 
activity. 
Among the U.S. leading indicators,  it can be seen in Table 8 that two 
exhibit a median lead of under three months and two a lead of only three 
months. For the United Kingdom only one series has a lead of less than 
three months and four a lead of only three months. In several cases the 
median leads are far longer for the U.K. series than for the United States 
ones, a fact reflected  ri the average lead of 5.7 months for U.K. indicators 
against only 5.0 months for the United States. These differences are all 
relatively small, and the significant factor is that the U.K. series exhibit 
leading behavior remarkably similar to that of their U.S. counterparts. 
The same conclusion is applicable to the lagging indicators except that 
the lags are mostly even longer for the United Kingdom than for the United 
States. This group includes the single exception to the timing similarity 
between indicator turns in both countries: advances by London clearing 
banks, a series that leads more often than it lags. It is the closest equivalent 
to the U.S. series for commercial and industrial loans outstanding, and the 
discrepancy may be due to differences in what the two series actually 
measure or to a real difference in the behavior of business ending in the 
two countries. In Mintz's study of West Germany, although it was confined 134  Philip A. Klej 
to coincident indicators, there is also one discrepancy between U.S.  and 
German indicators, namely, in incomes, oarticularly wage incomes, which 
tended to lag behind in Germany but not in the United States (Moore and
Shiskin 1967,  p. 29). 
Overall, the significance of Table 8 lies in the highly consistent typical
behavior of the indicators  it  reveals for both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, as well as for such comparisons as presently are possible
for Germany. 
THE TIMING BEHAVIOR OF GROWTH CYCIE
 
TURNING P01 NISA THREE-COUNTRY COMPAR ISON
 
It is appropriate to conclude this interim report by  suggesting some of the 
possibilities opened up by the development of the  IEI and u.S. growth 
cycle chronologies. Although the NBER analysis  of U.S.  indicators at
growth cycle turns  is  still under review, there  is now a tentative U.S. 
growth cycle chronology devised by Use Mintz which may be considered
along with that for the U.K. developed here and the earlier chronology
developed by Mintz for West Germany.lB 
In Chart 2 a simple comparison is presented of the postwar growth cycle
turning points in the United Kingdom,  West Germany, and the United
States. Despite the simplicity of the  presentation, a number of interesting 
relationships are revealed. The top pair of curves shows a surprisingly close
relationship between the growth cycles of the United Kingdom and West 
Germany. The next two pairs show that all the growth cycles in the United
Kingdom and in West Germany can be matched with growth cycles in the
United States. The major exception  to the pattern is the presence of two
extra cycles for the United States. The  greater frequency (hence shorter
duration) of U.S. cycles is not new and can be seen in earlier periods in
comparisons of classical cycles.  Incidentally, the 1 960s, frequently referred to as the longest peacetime  expansion in U.S. history, when  viewed in
terms of growth cycles is neither noteworthy for its undue length,  nor very
different from the growth  cycle pattern of the  1 950s, also shown in the chart. 
Consideration of the leads and lags among the turning points in the three
reference chronologies presents perhaps the most  provocative set of ques­
tions for future study. The consistency with which the peaks and troughs  in tIle U.K. chronology lead the matched turns in both West German and U.S.
growth cycles is striking. In comparisons between the United Kingdom and
West Germany (the top pair of curves), the former leads without exception
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 136  Philip A. Klein 
lag. in comparisons between  the United Kingdom arid the United States 
the former leads with but one exception at peaks and two at troughs. In the 
LS.-West Germany comparison  (bottom pair of curves) the latter leads 
except at the  1 958 trough and the 1960  peak. 
One can never argue, oi course, that tinhing relationships reflect causal 
Nonetheless  the evidence of rather sequences in any simplistic way. 
consistent lags iii the turns in U.S.  growth cycles behind corresponding 
turns in both West Germany and the United Kingdom at the very least does 
little to bolster the popular notion (in  Europe, in any case) that economic 
difficulties in the U nitecl States have been the source of similar difficulties 
in European econonhies. All that can  be said on the basis of the present 
evidence is that  if that theory is correct it did not manifest itself in the 
postwar period by anything as simple and obvious as consistent U.S. leads 
at growth cycle turning points. 
In the final analysis the major significance of the chart lies l)erhaps in the 
questions it  raises and the future work it suggests for the International 
Economic Indicators project. Are the U.S. lags shown in Chart 2 to be 
found in the relationship between turns in U.S. growth cycles and those in 
other economies as well? Do all European growth cycles conform to each 
other as closely as do those of West Germany and the United Kingdom? 
Will subsequent analysis of leading indicators by country, including com­
parisons involving analytical devices such as composite indexes of groups 
of indicators, exhibit similar relationships? Will they enable us to point to 
particular types of economic activity by which instability might be transmit­
ted from country to country? Will t.e addition of our data on international 
trade and other external economic relationships help us to explain the 
temporal relationships already revealed in Chart 2 for the three countries 
for which growth cycle chronologies have been developed, or will we 
have to look in greater detail or in new ways at interrelationships within 
each country viewed initially as a closed economy before the ways by 
which economic instability  is exported can be more completely under­
stood? In short, the patterns revealed in Chart 2 seeni to point both to the 
potential usefulness of the IEI  project and to the challenges which its 
successful completion must meet. 
UTIliZING GROWTH CHRONOI.OGIES-
AN IllUSTRATION 
We have already noted that the pattern of turning points revealed in Chart 
2 does very little to bolster what might be called the "sneeze hypothesis 
t"when the United States sneezes, Europe catches cold").19 Here I will 
illustrate how the development of growth chronologies can be employed to a-
137 
postwar Growth Cycles in the United Kingdom 
test the validity of that hypothesis in somewhat  more specific form than
was the case earlier when only the turning Puilils were Compared
The nieaning of the sneeze hypothesis is,  presumably, that when the
United States suffers a recession, the consequent reduction in its demand,
including its demand for importsrelatively mild in U.S. termsproduces 
a relatively severe contraction in the exporting countries 
The sneeze hypothesis appears to represent  a particular version of what
might be called the traditional hypothesis, which was well stated long ago
by Wesley Clair Mitchell:  Prosperity  in  any one country stimulates 
demand for the products of other countries, and so quickens the activities
in the latter regions....Further, prosperity  .  . encourages investnients
abroad as well as at home, and the export of capital  to other countries 
gives an impetus to their trade. A recession checks all these stimuli" (1927, 
p. 446). 
Mitchell's notion would appear to make the chain of causation run from 
the country recovering or contracting earliest  or most strongly to other 
economies. This generalization might, of course, be modified according to 
the degree of dependence on imports or foreign capital investment. This 
notion of Mitchell's, coupled with the recognition that the Linited  States 
was relatively less dependent on exports than other economies, led to the 
assumption that the sneeze was invariably America's and the  cold 
Europe's. It  is therefore worth reassessing the traditional explanations of 
how international trade provides a conduit for the international  transmis­
sion of cyclical disturbances. This is one of the possible by-products of the 
IEI project. At this point, clearly, only limited information is available, but  it 
is worth presenting as a way of illustrating the uses of the new growth cycle 
chronologies. The data considered involve trade between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
The traditional hypothesis, as advanced by Mitchell, would lead one to 
expect that: 
U.S. exports to the United Kingdom would conform well to U.K. 
growth cycles, and 
U.K. exports to the United States would conform well to U.S. growth 
cycles. 
These expectations would reflect the direct effects of prosperity  or reces­
sion in the importing country on the volume of its imports. (Clearly, the 
transmission of cyclical changes through such trade effects would be more 
pronounced under fixed exchange rates operating with full convertibility 
than under floating and rigid controls.) If,  in addition, the United States 
exports its recessions, along the lines of the sneeze hypothesis, one might 
expect that: 
U.K. exports would conform well to U.K. growth cycles. 
On the other hand, if the sneeze hypothesis works in the opposite direction 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Postwar Growth Cycles in the United Kingdon  1 3q 
4.  u.S. exports would be expected to  conform well to U S. growth
cycles. 
Calculations based on annual data for 1952i 972 show that l)ypotheses
and 2 are firmly supported (see Table  9). U.S. exports to the  United
Kingdom show faster rates of growth during U.K.  upswings than down­
swings in every instance,  i.e., seven times out of seven (column  1). The
average annual rate of growth of U.S. exports during U.K.  upswings, $230
million per year, greatly exceeds the corresponding  average during U.K.
downswings, $29 million per year. Similarly, U.K.  exports to the United
States grow faster during U.S. upswings than downswings in eleven in­
stances out of twelve (column 4). Here the average growth during  U.S. 
upswings, $185  million,  compares with an average decline during 
downss'ings of $7 million. Thus, the traditional view that domestic condi­
tions are a dominant factor in the control of the flow of imports in this 
two-way trade  is  clearly  demonstrated  by  the  new growth  cycle
chronologies. 
Some support can also be found for the  sneeze hypothesis, but it seenis 
to work as well if not better in the opposite direction to the conimon view. 
U.K. exports to the United States grow faster during U.K. upswings than 
downswings five times out of seven, but the average rate during upswings, 
S186 million, is only slightly larger than the  average during downswings, 
$126 million (column 2).  Ii this represents the effect of U.S.  sneezes, the 
result  is  hardly pneumonia. Indeed, the reverse effect  is  if  anything 
stronger, for U.S. exports to the United Kingdom grow faster during U.K. 
upswings than downswings ten times out of twelve, and the average 
growth rate during upswings, $142 million, differs quite sharply from the 
average decline during downswings, $14 million (column 3). In neither 
case, however, do the differences seem large enough to represent an 
important influence on the gross'th cycle in either country. 
Thus we are led to conclude that domestic growth cycles in both the 
United States and United Kingdom have significant effects on the other 
country's exports to them and that this represents one of tile ways by which 
growth cycles spread internationally. But we have not found evidence that 
the contagion runs in a dominant way from the United States to the United 
Kingdom. 
If this type of analysis were extended to a number of countries, using 
quarterly or monthly data, and including not only exports and imports but 
also investments, other capital movements, etc.,  it would no doubt be 
possible to trace with far greater precision the impact of international 
economic relations on the transmission of growth cycles from one country 
to another. Furthermore, the development of leading indicators of growth 
cycles would permit study of their value as forecasters of foreign trade 
trends. a
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APPENDIX A:  SAMPLE CHARTS FOR  SELECTED 
U.K. SERIES 
One series has been selected from each group of leading, roughly coinci­ dent, and lagging  indicators. A full set of working  charts similar to the












































































































































































































CHART A-3	  United Kingdom: Fixed Capital Expenditure,
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APPENDIX B:  BASIC DATA 
The following tables  are available on request to the National  Bureau of
Economic Research: 
B-i	  Median and Mean Timing  Patterns of 38 U.K. Indicators  at U.K.

Growth Cycle Turns,  I 951 1972
 
B-2
  Titles and Sources of 38  U.K. Indicators and Mean Lead () or Lag (+) at U.K. Growth Cycle  Turns 
B-3	  Comparative List of U.K., U.S., and West German Indicators 143  postwar Growth  Cycles in the United Kingdom 
B-4  Summary Measures for Composite Indexes of U.K. Leading  and 
Roughly Coincident Indicators 
B-5  Composite Index ul 12 
1948-1973 
Lea.ling  indicators,  United Kingdom, 
B-6  Composite Index of 6 Roughly Coincident Indicators, United King 
dom, 1949-1972 
B-7  Turning Points Selected in All U.K. Time Series 
B-8  Value of U.K. Exports to the United States and U.S. Exports to the 
United Kingdom. 1952-1972 
NOTES 
This is, in fact, the method adopted by O'De.3 (1975). Peaks and troughs in unemploy­
ment are used for the reference chronology. to the analysis of a single sector of the 
economy a reference chronology pertaining specifically to that sector has merit, al­
though complications ensue when other sectors are brought into the analysis. As it turns 
out, O'Dea's chronology of unemployment cycles is in one-to-one correspondence with 
the growth cycle chronology developed in this paper. His dates lag behind the grosvth 
cycle dates in all but two instances, where they are coincident. His dates differ from 
mine for unemployment in four instances (1966-1972), because his series has no trend 
adjustment.
 
They analyzed data for Great Britain, France, and Germany. as weil as the United States.
 
Current experience in the United States provides an example. Real GNP reached a peak 
in the fourth quarter of 1973, and the decline during the next two quarters was 
comparable in magnitude with earlier cyclical declines in real GNP in 1969-1970, 
1960-1961, 1948-1949, and 1926-1927. But this has not been true, so far at any rate, 
of any other independently measured major aggregate such as industrial production or 
employment. 
Quarterly data were handled on a comparable basis, employing a twenty-quarter 
moving average with straight-line fits similarly calculated for the first ten  and last ten 
quarters in each series. Quarterly data were then analyzed in monthly terms, by using 
the midmonth of each peak or trough quarter to represent the turn. 
iwo chronologies were previously available for the United  Kingdom. Drakatos (1963) 
had produced a chronology of "leading indicators for the  British economy," with 
troughs in July 1952. November 1956, and September 1958, and  peaks in April 1951, 
December 1955, and September 1957. Only the December 1955 trough appears on my 
list. His 1951 peak leads mine, and his trough dates lag behind mine in 1952 and 1958. 
He also includes an extra cycle in 1956-1957. 
The other chronology I  encountered was an annual one by Matthews (1969), with 
troughs in  1952, 1 958, and 1 962, and peaks in 1951, 1955, 1960, and 1964. Like m!ne, 
IS his was based on deviations Ironi trends, and is otherwise  roughly similar, but !t 
impossible to go far in comparing an annual with a  monthly chronology. 
More recently, while this article was in press, the Central Statistical Office ot H.M. 
Treasury (1975) presented a chronology of its own in Economic  Trends (March 1975). In 
El project completed development of a  computer
addition, the National Bureau's 
program for producing growth cycle turning  points based on a common  methodology I
3
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for all industrialized, market-oriented economies, and the United Kingdom was among 
the first countrioc to which it was applied. Finally, O'Dea (1 975b)  published a ge:ieraj 
chronology, although lie ultimately relies on ''indicators of  target variables" for labor 
production, Investment, etc. The dates of the recently developed U.K.  chronologies and
their timing relative to the one developed in this study  are shown in the accompanying
Table A-i. 
The U.S. seriec Business Conditions Digest, BCD 50) was available from 1969 to 1973. 
(oh vacancies are now estimated via an index of help-wanted advertising  in newspapers
(BCD 46). 
Recent work suggests the United States has had six growth  recessions since 1950 against
only five in the United Kingdom. 
There is some evidence of an extra cycle in  1969-i 970, hut the period is clouded 
primarily by the shortness of the movements. Were they all  to be chosen as turning 
points, we would be breaking the NBER rule that intervals between  peaks or between
troughs must he at least fifteen nìonths long  to represent a genuine cycle 
The volatility of recent years in the GDP in constant prices, just alluded to, is to some 
extent reflected as well in GDP in current piices, although the selection of turning points
seems marginally less ambiguous. 
Deiaib concerning time periods covered and original sources of all U.K. Series used are 
given in Appendix B, which is available from the National  Bureau on request The
selections reported on in the text  are ultimately roy own, but were made in consultation 
with officials of the Central Statistical Office of the  United Kingdom whose advice and
facilities were placed at my disposal. They have my deep appreciation. 
In her recently published study of U.S.  growth cycles, Mintz (1975,  p. 73) found 
differences between GNP in current and  in constant prices as large as fifteen  months
(1957 peak) and twelve months (1969 peak). They  are disquieting in any country
because they suggest distortions caused  either by the deflation techniques employed or by the impact of inflation  itself on cyclical turns. 
O'Dea (1 975a) and others have suggested  that turns in British production should  be expected typically to lead turns in employment measures because entrepreneurs attempt
to adjust to demand changes by increasing the average work week before they increase
employment in the upswing and by decreasing the work week before they reduce  the lesel of employment in the downswing.  The lag is variously estimated at between one and three quarters, There is  a similar lag in U.S. data. 
For a discussion of the significant propeities of composite indexes, see Shiskin (1961, App. A). Ilse Mintz used Shiskin's  technique in her work on West  German and U.S. growth cycles (see notes 5 and  10, above). The technique is  currently used by the Department of Commerce in  constructing the leading, coincident, and  lagging indexes for Business Conditions Digest. 
The behavior of the (J.K. composite indexes summarized here may he compared with the behavior of comparable composite indicators for the United States  reported regularly in Business Conditions Digest.  The roughly coincident index  (BCD 820) shows leads or lags at U.S. classical cycle  turning points of as much  as four months. The median at peaks is a lead of one month, at troughs a lead of one month,  at both turns, zero. fCf Business (.onr/itior,s Digest,  Chart B7, each issue.) In  general the leads and lags  are shorter and less variable than those found for the United Kingdom; certainly discrepan­ cies as long as our longest,  the 22-month lag at the 1968 peak, are not found. The behavior of the U.K. composite index at that turn underscores the anomalous behavior of the underlying series  ri that period (cf. the discussion  of that turn in the text above) Appendix B, available  on request to the National Bureau,  contains a descriptive comparsoii of the U.K., U.S., and West  German indicator series. 
14 TABLE A-i  Three Alternative Chronologies Versus Klein Chronology 
P aks 
Lr,'d  -'  or I .ig  0 
Ki0in,  Months 
Le,,,i  -) Or 
.. 
Kle,fl  NBER  UX-CSO'  O'Dea'  N8[t1  (51)  ()'Dea  Kf,n  48ER  1JK-(5O'  O'Ora'  N8ER CSO  ()Disr 
2.51  5Si  - 251  ni  0  i052  1152  -- 7,S  +1  - -3 
I 255  i2'ss  - 1255  (1  -­ 0  I '513  Ii -'8  1058  9.58  0  -1  -2 
1160  361  3.60  761)  4  - --t  2.61  263  062  1.63  0  4  '1 
865  2.66  12.64  I 65  eh  -8  -7  8.67  );67  261,  867  -8  0 
1268  Ii 613  56')  3,69  - I  45  + 3  2'72  2r72  371  2'72  0  -II  C 
- - 7,73  - - - - - -
No. O comparl0000  5  3  5 
(eads  I 2 2	  4  .3 I 
Coinci(iCnceS  I  0  2	  1  0  2 
Lags  3 I  3	  (1 0 
Slcanleadl-t,,rlagl+)  -2.4  -37  -16	  -l}.8  --60  '-1.2 
'NBER international Indicators Project. March 6,  1975.
 




15.	  Ultimately, of course, it is the objective olihe International Economic Indicators project 
to compare and analyze the behavior of indicators at turning points in growth cycles 
rather than classical cycles. As stated earlier, the bulk of my analysis here is in terms of 
classical cycles for the United States but of growth cycles for the United Kingdom and 
(here) West Germany (see Table 2, note a). The classification of indicators in the United 
States has been based on classical cycle analysis. In my initial effort, therefore,  I 
implicitly assumed that the same classification would apply to growth cycles. While this 
will doubtless be true it need not (and probably will not) be true that the average timing 
of leads and lags will be the same at growth cycle turns as at classical cycle turns. 
Since the text was completed, Mintz's study (1974) of U.S. growth cycles has become 
available, and it  is interesting to suggest what may lie ahead for the larger project by 
comparing the timing at growth cycle peaks and troughs of as many of the coincident 
indicators included in Table 2 as she has included in her study. The results (from Mintz 
1974, Table 11) are summarized below; the figures are for the median timing of each 
series (in months) at U.S. growth cycles: 
Peaks  Trough5 
Personal income  0  0
 
GNP (current prices)  +1.0  0
 
GNP (constant prices)  -0.5
 
Index of industrial production  -0.5  -1
 
Employees on rronag. payrolls  -0.5  -1
 
Unemployment rate (percent; inverted)  0  0
 
Mean of medians	  -0,1  -0.2 
Median of medians	  -0.5  0 
The average tinting or tce indicators appears to he closer to the turning points of 
growth cycles than 01 classical c,cles and somewhat closer, therefore, than the timing, 
already considered in lable 2, of the comparable West German and U.K. indicator; at 
growth cycle turns. The coinciders appear to be least close in West Germany, with the 
United Kingdom falling into an intermediate position. The results indisputably suggest 
the importance of continuing our work on indicators by carrying through comparable 
should be analyses around growth cycle turns. However, not too much significance Philip A. Klein 
imputed to these tentative U.S. growth cycle findings. since the ni mhi'r of fld !,1tOr5 
the table above is small and iloes not include sonw ot those which showed the higgs
deviations troni classical cycles in Table 2; in addition, the medians obscuresonic turns 
at individual U.S. growth cycle turning 1x)intc, e.g  1- 17 months br personal incon1 
and + 18 months for nonagricultural employmentboth at the Apt il  96 1 growth 'vc)e 
peak. these ,lre as long almost as an we have observed in the United  Kingdom Ruth
means and medians obscure dispersion around (Item that is symmetrical, and  growth
cycles generally are more symmetrical than classical cycles because the formerare trend 
adjusted. As the previous discussion  in  the text  has  indicated, one of the  niot 
troublesome problems in selecting cyclical turning points is the rlispersion  in turns in 
presumably coincident  nd icators. 
Moore and Shuskin (1967, App. B). Calculations show that there are 174 comparisons 
possible for (tie 25 roughly coincident indicators, with 200 of them turning within three 
months of the reference dates (ibid., pp 9798). 
Mintz's recent work on US. growth cycles suggests that three arklitional  recesii1s in 
1951-1952, 1962-1.63. and  1 966-I 967, are added by the transition from classical  to
growth cycles.
 
The new U.S. growth cycle chronology is reported in  Miniz (1974). This study is,

roughly, an apphcation of the techniques Mintz developed
  in her 1970 study on West 
Germany, and again does not go beyond the problem  of dating cycle turns. Like her
West Germany study, therefore,  it opens the door to the kind of indicator analysis 
contemplated for the tEl study and which I attempt here to sketch in for the case of the
United Kingdom. 
Charles Kindleherger, for example, comments, "Sir Dennis Rol)ertsori once referred to 
the critical dependence of Europe on cycles originating  in the United States, to say that 
'when the United States sneezed, Europe caught  pneumonia.' '' Charles Kindleberger, 
Intern,it,opal Economics, 4th Ed., Homewood, Illinois,  Richard D. Irwin, 1968,  p. 483. 
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